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F
ew doubt that executive compensation arrangements 
encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led 
to the financial crisis of 2008. Accordingly, academics 
and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker 
pay practices. But regulator pay is to blame as well, and fixing 
it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. 
Regulatory failures during the crisis resulted at least in part 
from a lack of sufficient incentives for bank examiners to act 
aggressively to prevent excessive risk taking by banks. While 
banker pay may have been too high-powered—too focused on 
shareholder value and insufficiently sensitive to potential losses, 
which would ultimately be borne by taxpayers—bank regulators’ 
pay was not high-powered enough and therefore, ironically, also 
insufficiently sensitive to potential losses to taxpayers. 
Bank regulators are not paid for performance. They are civil 
servants paid a fixed salary that does not depend on whether their 
actions improve banks’ performance, protect banks from failure, 
or increase social welfare. In fact, trying to curb risk taking at a 
bank may be personally very costly for a bank regulator. Without 
a larger upside than what civil service compensation offers, regu-
lators too often do the rational thing and play it safe, shying away 
from confrontation over potentially ill-advised bank policies.
To create better incentives, we propose that regulators, spe-
cifically bank examiners, be compensated in part with periodic 
bonuses tied to the value of bank debt and equity, as well as a sepa-
M. Todd Henderson is professor of law at the University of Chicago 
Law School. Frederick Tung is the Howard Zhang Faculty Research 
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Paying Bank Examiners 
for Performance
Should regulators receive bonuses for effectively  
guarding the public interest?
By M. todd HendeRson University of Chicago School of Law 
and FRedeRick tung Boston University Law School
rate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to take over a failing 
bank. Giving examiners a stake in bank performance, both upside 
and downside, will improve their incentives to act in the public 
interest. In contrast to most other types of bureaucratic functions, 
objective metrics exist to help measure the alignment of bank 
regulators’ activities with the public interest. With the right mix 
of banks’ debt and equity securities, public trading prices for these 
securities serve this purpose. A pay-for-performance culture there-
fore offers special promise for banking regulation as compared to 
other areas of regulation or government bureaucracy. 
Because examiners have shown a bias toward nonintervention, 
we propose a debt-heavy mix of bank securities so that regulators 
bear the downside risk of nonintervention. To address insider 
trading and government ownership issues, we propose that regu-
lators hold “phantom” securities whose payout is linked with 
actual bank debt and equity prices.
Though we do not discount the value of public spiritedness 
and reputation as inducements toward conscientious regulation, 
regulators’ dismal performance in the recent financial crisis 
makes us skeptical that public-spirited motivations are sufficient 
incentive. At scores of banks, examiners and other regulators were 
well aware of operational deficiencies and excessive risk taking 
several years before those banks failed. But regulators stood still 
in the face of this information. Instead of demanding corrective 
action by banks, examiners continued to rate risky institutions as 
“fundamentally sound.” Washington Mutual (WaMu), the largest 
bank to fail in U.S. history at the time, enjoyed a “fundamentally 
sound” rating until six days before its collapse. This regulatory Ill
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failure was not a result of insufficient information or attention 
on the part of regulators. In the three years before WaMu’s col-
lapse, examiners spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days inspect-
ing its assets and operations. Despite the wealth of information, 
examiners failed to do the heavy lifting required to stop the exces-
sive risk taking. The WaMu example is hardly unique. 
Adding or subtracting examiner pay based on bank capital 
costs incentivizes regulators toward striking a socially optimal 
balance between increasing bank values and credit and reducing 
the costs of bank failure. This could mean more or less regula-
tion, depending on the bank and the circumstances. For instance, 
examiners with pay linked to bank debt may pursue a more inter-
ventionist approach in some cases, since they bear some of the 
losses arising from the socially inefficient risk that exists on their 
watch. Regulators incentivized to worry about losses to taxpay-
ers may be more diligent in their supervision of bank assets and 
management, may be more aggressive in assuring that corrective 
recommendations are implemented, may encourage or require 
changes to bank balance sheets, and so on. 
Similarly, examiners who gain from increases in bank values 
(for example, by holding phantom bank stock) may take steps to 
make the examination process more efficient, to get the amount 
and type of disclosures right, and to encourage valuable lending 
and risk taking. 
While we leave it to agency heads to develop optimal compen-
sation practices over time, even small steps in the direction of our 
proposal could have large effects on the efficiency of banking reg-
ulation. The need to incentivize regulators is especially important 
after the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, whose 
say-on-pay provision is likely to generate even higher-powered 
incentives for managers to maximize shareholders’ private inter-
ests. High-powered bank CEO incentives require a corresponding 
impetus for regulators to proactively constrain bank risk taking.
Regulators’ Pay and Its Discontents
We are not the first to point out the problems with the standard 
pay structure for bureaucrats. Four decades ago, Gary Becker 
and George Stigler published a seminal article arguing for 
incentive pay for the enforcement of laws. Their suggestions 
were perhaps ahead of their time. Not until nearly 20 years later 
did performance pay for CEOs become common practice. It 
would likely have been something of a stretch to adopt perfor-
mance pay for government agents before private sector actors. 
Our incentive compensation proposal borrows not only from 
the neglected economics literature of the past. It also finds hope 
in changed pay practices for government officials implemented 
in the last few years. The Obama administration has dramatically 
increased regulators’ salaries. According to public records, the 
number of federal government officials earning six-figure sala-
ries has skyrocketed. In addition, bank regulatory agencies have 
begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to performance. During the 
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period 2003–2006, three regulator agencies—the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency—paid out nearly $20 million 
in retention and performance bonuses to bank examiners and 
other regulators. In 2006 alone, the FDIC gave bonuses to 2,000 
bank examiners. 
While perhaps a step in the right direction, those modest 
moves toward performance pay for regulators are less than ideal. 
Ex post bonuses are not likely to yield incentives as high-powered 
as our approach, which relies on ex ante incentive contracts tied to 
outside metrics. Prior to the 1990s, CEOs routinely received cash 
bonuses and yet pay and performance were not as tightly linked 
as when stock and stock options came into use. To the extent 
that ex post bonus payments are discretionary, they allow for the 
intrusion of nonperformance-based criteria, such as favoritism, 
political affiliation, and so on. The linkage between bonuses and 
conduct that maximizes social welfare may therefore be tenuous. 
Ex post bonuses are also likely to be one-sided—that is, paid in 
good times but not recouped in bad times. This is likely to bias 
regulation in a particular direction.
Regulator Pay and the 2008 Crisis
There is widespread agreement that regulators failed to act 
aggressively enough during the recent financial crisis. The 
problem was not one primarily of access to information, lack of 
expertise, or resource constraints. Reviewing regulators’ perfor-
mance following bank failures, regulatory agencies’ inspectors 
general reached the same conclusion: regulators did a satisfac-
tory job of identifying problems well in advance of failure, but 
they failed to act aggressively enough to remedy the identified 
problems. The problem, in our view, was that regulators did not 
have the right incentives to turn their recommendations into 
actual reforms of bank policies.
Regulatory failure | The examination process has two broad 
goals: review of the quality of bank assets, with special focus 
on the bank’s most important assets, its loans; and analysis of 
the bank’s financial condition and the quality of its manage-
ment and operations. Examiners enjoy wide discretion as to 
the volume of loans reviewed, the nature of the examination, 
the time spent on each analysis, and the consequences of the 
examination results. Examiners make local judgments about 
the credit quality of each asset. After discussion with loan offi-
cers and bank managers, examiners make final determinations 
(effectively unreviewable) about how to classify particular loans 
for input into a final supervisory rating. Examiners also review 
loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as concentration risk, 
violations of legal rules, and deviations from bank loan and 
underwriting policies. They assess the behavior and impact 
of subsidiaries and affiliates, risks from litigation, the costs 
and benefits of off-balance-sheet activities, and the activities 
of insiders. Based on this process, examiners determine the 
bank’s CAMELS rating, which is the single metric used by 
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regulators to capture bank safety and soundness. (“CAMELS” 
is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.).
Regulators have tremendous power to influence bank deci-
sion-making. Much of the actual power resides with bank exam-
iners in their conduct of bank examinations. For example, the 
decision to change a bank’s CAMELS rating from 2 to 3 (moving 
the bank from “fundamentally sound” to indicating “some 
degree of supervisory concern”) is largely if not entirely within 
the discretion of the bank examiner. Because any regulatory inter-
vention depends on examiners to identify problems and pursue 
initial ratings downgrades, effective incentives for examiners 
to act are crucial for optimal regulation. Examiner passivity, by 
contrast, effectively insulates a troubled bank from higher-level 
scrutiny and corrective sanctions.
Reports by inspectors general of the Treasury Department 
conclude that regulators did not do enough to prevent multiple 
banks from taking excessive risk and failing. Although acute 
funding constraints were a precipitating factor for many bank 
failures, this shock was not sufficient to explain bank failures. 
One report explains, “Although the deterioration in the bank’s 
financial condition was severe in 2008, the underlying risks were 
evident in the preceding years.” The consensus seems to be that 
if regulators had been more aggressive, hundreds of billions in 
losses could have been avoided.
In general, regulatory failures fell into two broad but discrete 
categories that correspond to the supervisory functions. The 
first category is the failure to adequately inspect and supervise 
bank risk taking during “good” times—that is, periods without 
financial stress. We might think of this as a failure to do adequate 
preventive medicine. The failure reports describe many instances 
in which the regulators did not ensure compliance with basic 
risk policies and/or restrict certain types of risk taking. For 
instance, regarding the failure of IndyMac in 2008, the inspector 
general of the Treasury Department concluded that “examiners 
did not identify or sufficiently address the core weaknesses that 
ultimately caused the thrift to fail until it was too late.” As noted 
above, problems often resulted from the failure to deploy regula-
tory tools as banks took increasingly large and risky positions.
The second category is the failure to react to signs of distress 
and intervene quickly enough to prevent further damage. The 
$2.5 billion collapse of NetBank illustrates. According to the 
Treasury Department inspector general, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision “did not react in a timely and forceful manner to 
certain repeated indications of problems.” A similar lapse pre-
ceded the $2 billion failure of ANB Financial. The regulator—the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency—“did not issue a formal 
enforcement action in a timely manner” after the bank began to 
suffer losses and experience distress. 
The failure reports show that, in both categories of supervi-
sion, regulators engaged in more box-checking and paperwork 
than aggressive oversight. Bank examiners did the important 
work of assessing bank assets and risk. They saw deficiencies and 
recommended changes, but then never followed up to see if those 
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higher-ups and the regulated party, each of which may push back 
strongly—costs for regulators will rise. Regulators interested in 
not appearing before congressional committees, defending bud-
gets, and being forced to testify in court would likely err on the 
side of regulatory restraint, especially when they do not capture 
the upside from aggressive regulation and do not bear much of 
the downside cost of laxity. 
There is also the revolving door problem. Some regulators are 
bound to get some of their expected compensation from future 
employment with regulated banks. These banks may prefer as 
future employees those examiners who show diligence in their 
work but passivity in the face of bank interests or pressure. 
Examiners may also fear making a mistake by restricting the 
lending of a seemingly successful bank. This problem may be 
exacerbated by the fact that examiners routinely work with the 
same bank for extended periods. They often go to work every day 
at the bank they are examining. While it is possible that familiar-
ity breeds contempt, the opposite effect—akin to the Stockholm 
syndrome—may also skew regulatory decisions, especially where 
actions require confrontation. 
Moreover, the relative secrecy surrounding bank examinations 
may also encourage regulatory inertia. Secrecy no doubt plays a 
useful role in encouraging bankers to be forthcoming with their 
examiners. Secrecy also insulates banks from the possibility of pub-
lic overreaction to negative assessments from bank examinations, 
thereby avoiding the runs that deposit insurance and banking 
regulation were meant to cure. At the same time, however, secrecy 
also insulates examiners and the examination process from public 
accountability. When the Securities and Exchange Commission 
or the Environmental Protection Agency issues an order or takes 
other regulatory action against a violator, that action attracts pub-
lic scrutiny. Failure to act in the face of egregious circumstances 
similarly attracts public attention. While public perception may 
not always be a useful metric for evaluating regulatory action, at 
the least it forces regulators to explain their actions—or inactions. 
Bank supervision, by contrast, is largely free from this account-
ability because of the secrecy of bank examinations. 
Examiner passivity could be deterred by the loss of reputa-
tion, money, or other benefit because of the examiner’s failure 
to act against a bank that later collapses. But no such deterrent 
currently exists. If a bank fails, there are multiple causes to which 
blame can be assigned. In contrast, there is only the examiner 
to blame if reports are not accurately completed and done well. 
Under existing incentives, examiners might naturally conclude 
that their job is well done simply by accurately describing prob-
lems and bringing them to the attention of management and 
senior regulators. They have no stake in doing more. Job and sal-
ary security reduce incentives to do “good” work, however defined, 
since the consequences of “bad” work are reduced.
To be sure, many regulators value doing the right thing and 
serving the public interest. But given the ambiguity of these 
terms and the potential for rationalization, the absence of mon-
etary or reputational rewards or sanctions means examiners care 
less than they would in the presence of more high-powered incen-
changes were implemented. For instance, WaMu’s regulator did 
not “formally track the status of examiner recommendations and 
[required] corrective actions.” Another (typical) report concluded:
We found that bank management did not effectively implement key 
examiner recommendations over several examination cycles regarding 
such controls as loan-to-value limits, interest reserve policies, 
stress testing and establishing meaningful concentration limits, 
and maintenance of a sufficient [allowance for losses] and 
adequate capital structure. (Emphasis added.)
This same phenomenon recurred with shocking frequency in the 
recent bank failures.
Regulators’ incentives | Why would examiners, who repeat-
edly identified problem areas, continue to rate WaMu and 
other banks so highly in the face of obvious shortcomings in 
their business models and practices? Why did examiners err so 
egregiously on the side of nonintervention, in the face of spe-
cific policy guidance to the contrary? The answer is incentives. 
Like everyone else, bank examiners maximize according to the 
incentive structure in which they find themselves. Bank examin-
ers are paid almost entirely in fixed salary that varies primarily by 
seniority. Examiners also cannot easily be terminated. They enjoy 
the special job security fashioned by the civil service rules. This 
job security may make some sense. With their fixed salaries, if 
examiners could be terminated for poor performance, they might 
be extremely risk averse. For example, if a bank failure on an 
examiner’s watch significantly increased her risk of termination, 
the regulator’s incentive would be to ensure that the bank was 
not taking much risk. Though good for the regulator, the social 
cost from reduced credit availability and lost bank profits might 
be quite high. Reduced job security might also subject examiners 
to political pressure for doing their jobs too well. Regulated banks 
might be able to bring political pressure to bear on conscientious 
regulators unwilling, say, to allow a failing bank to continue 
operating or to permit a bank’s excessive risk taking. Job security 
therefore reduces counterproductive risk aversion and the risk of 
political capture, giving examiners discretion in applying regula-
tion, perhaps in ways that improve social welfare. 
But without additional incentives, the civil service rules 
may also create perverse incentives by insulating regulators too 
well from the consequences of their job performance. With pay 
delinked from an objective performance metric, regulators may 
naturally focus on bureaucratic tasks with observable outcomes, 
rather than on more aggressive and costly actions with more 
complex and less transparent cause-and-effect relationships. 
Performing the examination and filling out examination 
reports is entirely within the examiners’ control. This output is 
subject to objective performance metrics (e.g., is the report com-
pleted on time and in a competent manner?). And reports alone 
are unlikely to generate collateral costs for examiners. In contrast, 
aggressive follow-up enforcement is likely to raise the personal 
costs to examiners significantly, with little or no personal benefit. 
As the work moves from investigation to persuasion—both of 
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tives. We do not doubt the honesty or good faith of the regulators 
who felt that they were doing the best they could do. We simply 
observe that regulators are influenced in ways beyond their ken, 
just as we all are. They respond rationally to the incentives they 
face, and can rationalize their conduct to fit to those incentives. 
We propose to change the incentives.
The Structure of Regulator Pay for Performance
The regulatory laxity preceding the recent crisis involved two 
distinct types of regulatory failure: the failure to apply preven-
tive medicine when times were good and the failure to act 
aggressively when a bank showed signs of distress. Our incen-
tive pay proposal has two distinct components to address those 
separate problems. 
Bank debt-equity portfolio | First, offering a bonus linked 
to a bank debt-equity portfolio would offer real-time market 
feedback and long-run incentives to the examiner regarding the 
bank’s risk taking and its potential rewards. This component 
would matter primarily during good times, while the bank 
is operating in the ordinary course. Its purpose is to incen-
tivize preventive and remedial measures well before a bank 
approaches distress. 
We consider two potential debt benchmarks: 
■■ a subordinated debt security issued by the bank, and
■■ a credit default swap contract (CDS) referencing a junior 
debt obligation of the bank holding company parent of the 
regulated bank (BHC). 
The prices of publicly traded subordinated debt securities and 
CDS contracts reflect the market’s best estimate of the risk of the 
bank’s default on its debt. Holding this risk-sensitive instrument 
gives the examiner a personal financial incentive to curb exces-
sive risk at the bank. (Some amount of BHC equity should be 
included as well in order to guard against undue examiner risk 
aversion.) With both the debt and equity components, we suggest 
a relative performance approach, which would filter out the effect 
of industry-wide or market-wide price movements. As noted, the 
lion’s share of this “preventive medicine” component of incentive 
pay should be debt-based. 
To encourage a medium- to long-term regulatory perspective, 
each periodic phantom debt-equity allocation would have a speci-
fied medium- to long-term maturity. At maturity, say three to five 
years after the initial award, the allocation would be cashed out 
at the then–market values of its underlying debt and equity com-
ponents. With regular periodic allocations, the examiner would 
hold multiple tranches of phantom securities with staggered 
payouts, giving the examiner incentive to consider the long-term 
as well as short-term consequences of her regulatory decisions, 
and making short-term manipulations of securities prices an 
unattractive strategy. 
The appropriate debt-equity mix in the regulator’s portfolio 
will depend on a number of factors, some of which will be specific 
to the regulated bank, to the regulating agency, to the particular 
times, and perhaps even to the individual examiner. We therefore 
make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions for the optimal ratio. 
The mix should induce regulators to care about bank profits but 
not at the expense of risk shifting to creditors. In the face of exces-
sive risk, the negative reaction from debt markets should reduce 
the value of the debt component of the portfolio by more than 
any positive reaction from equity markets would augment the 
value of the equity component.
takeover bonus | Our second component, the takeover bonus, 
becomes important as a bank approaches distress. The exam-
iner would be eligible for a cash bonus based on the timing 
of her decision to take over a failing bank. Regulators have a 
number of reasons to wait too long before effecting a takeover. 
This bonus would ameliorate the problem. 
Bank regulators are by statute tasked with the specific goal 
of minimizing losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The 
bonus could therefore be tied specifically to the ultimate losses 
sustained by the DIF at the resolution of the FDIC’s receivership 
proceeding. We suggest several approaches to estimating these 
losses ex ante in order to incentivize improved timing of bank 
takeover decisions.
The takeover decision requires special treatment for a number 
of reasons. First, it is the most difficult and drastic decision the reg-
ulator must make in her supervision of the bank. The regulator has 
a number of reasons for being reluctant to pull the plug on a failing 
bank. Regulatory capture and the Stockholm effect may dissuade 
the regulator from taking over the bank. Pulling the plug might 
also highlight the regulator’s past mistakes in not intervening 
more forcefully. At any given point, the regulator might prefer to 
wait and see, hoping the bank will turn itself around. As the recent 
financial crisis illustrates—like all others before it—regulators tend 
to err on the side of taking over too late rather than too early. This 
delay in the crisis exacerbated banks’ losses and the ultimate costs 
to the DIF. A resolution bonus would offer a direct incentive to 
make the right timing decision at a critical juncture. 
Moreover, although the FDIC is charged by statute with the 
specific goal of minimizing DIF losses in its dealings with trou-
bled banks, the FDIC is typically not involved in the takeover deci-
sion, which rests with each bank’s chartering agency or primary 
federal regulator. The FDIC takes over only after a bank has been 
declared insolvent and put into resolution. Because the other 
agencies do not have their own money at stake in the timing of 
the takeover, the incentives to wait and see may be overwhelming.
Market discipline from the regulator’s bank debt-equity 
portfolio may not be useful in optimizing the timing of takeover 
because of information asymmetry. Market signals are likely to 
be noisy as a bank nears distress. Optimal timing will depend to 
a great extent on fine-grained private information, which is avail-
able only to the regulator and is constantly being updated once 
takeover becomes a real possibility. A one-time bonus distinct 
from any market assessment of the decision is therefore advisable.
Because of the importance of minimizing DIF losses, low 
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losses should trigger high bonuses and vice-versa. In theory, then, 
if an examiner were to put a bank into resolution at time T1, and 
as a result the FDIC losses were 100, the examiner would get a 
larger bonus than if the decision were made at T2 when the FDIC 
losses would be 200. 
Implementing this simple idea may not be straightforward. 
First, if we could discern the counterfactual losses that would 
have occurred at T2, then the calculation would be simple. But, of 
course, a takeover at T1 makes it impossible to know the counter-
factual T2 outcome. Second, it is entirely possible that a consci-
entious examiner might decide, given the information available 
to her at T1, to wait until T2 for more information. Important 
developments concerning the bank’s prospects—the direction of 
certain asset or lending markets, for example—might be worth 
waiting for. Perhaps paradoxically, the more uncertain are the 
bank’s prospects, the more value there is in waiting. Third, even if 
a regulator made an (ex ante) optimally timed decision to resolve a 
failed bank, disposing of the bank’s assets may take several years. 
That process will affect the ultimate DIF loss figures and will not 
be under the examiner’s control. So a “final” resolution will be 
hard to predict at the time of takeover.
Despite these seeming hurdles, a resolution bonus may still 
offer important motivation for a regulator to act promptly in put-
ting a bank into resolution, as compared to the current compen-
sation system. The timing of the takeover will no doubt have an 
important effect on the severity of DIF losses, and warning signs 
in terms of bank characteristics and practices that lead to large 
resolution losses are not so mysterious. Researchers have identi-
fied factors that correlate with increased losses and estimated 
the economic magnitudes of these effects. The findings gener-
ally comport with common intuition. Bank asset composition 
and quality affect ultimate losses, as does liability structure. For 
example, brokered deposits—“hot money” aggregated by brokers 
seeking higher yields—are positively associated with high-cost 
bank failures and shorter time to failure. The same is true for real 
estate owned and loans past due. Uncollected income—basically, 
nonperforming loans—correlates with high-cost failures. Local 
economic conditions also matter. State personal income growth 
and the health of the local banking industry are negatively cor-
related with FDIC losses, while in-state bankruptcy growth and 
the unemployment rate are positively correlated with FDIC losses.
The depth of existing research strongly suggests that a resolu-
tion bonus algorithm could be constructed to both guide and 
cabin regulators’ discretion as to the timing of a bank takeover. 
Some trial and error would be involved in optimizing the bonus 
structure in pursuit of minimizing DIF losses, but with learning 
and experience it might be possible to design a fully automated 
system in which market and other data are incorporated into the 
bonus algorithm.
Short of that, agencies can develop a mechanism for estimat-
ing what losses would have been had the examiner not acted when 
she did. For example, post-mortem reports, like those described 
above, could be helpful. The inspector general of the FDIC could 
estimate losses at hypothetical future intervals had the examiner 
not taken over the bank when she did. These reports could deploy 
a mix of economic models, learning from past failures, and expert 
opinions from inside and outside the regulatory agency. 
Could the takeover bonus induce the regulator to act too 
hastily in seizing a bank? Premature takeover is no more desir-
able than waiting too long; both destroy value. The regulator’s 
debt-equity portfolio would ameliorate the problem to a great 
extent because it gives the regulator a financial stake in the bank’s 
recovery. The key is to scale the takeover bonus relative to the 
potential value of the regulator’s debt-equity portfolio so that she 
neither permits futile gambles for solvency nor pulls the plug too 
early. Agencies might even implement non-trivial penalties for a 
takeover decision if the DIF ultimately suffers no losses because 
the examiner pulled the plug too soon.
Even if predicting ultimate FDIC losses is not an exact sci-
ence for the regulator making the takeover decision, neither is 
the loss assessment inscrutable. A lack of research or analysis is 
unlikely to be the reason why regulators have been too slow to 
pull the plug on failed banks. Empirical studies—many done by 
the FDIC—and post-mortem reports offer regulators a wealth of 
research to support the goal of minimizing DIF losses. Instead, 
regulators may simply need better incentives to get it right. A well-
structured bonus may help ameliorate this problem.
Qualifications and Objections
Incentive structures may sometimes generate not only desired 
outcomes but also some that are unintended and undesired. 
Our regulator incentive pay proposal is no exception. We do 
believe, however, that potential problems either can be over-
come or are not sufficiently serious to preclude the experimen-
tation along the lines we suggest.
crowding out the public interest | Some might object that 
incentive pay is fundamentally inconsistent with public service. 
Financial rewards for “success” might change the public-regard-
ing culture within regulatory agencies; financial incentives 
may crowd out the public spiritedness that would otherwise 
motivate employees. Instead of diligent altruistic service to the 
public, regulators and other agency employees might begin to 
view their roles in terms of market exchange. Regulators desir-
ing higher compensation would pursue the proffered financial 
rewards, while those who value leisure might feel free to work 
less and forgo the rewards for diligence. Once diligence has 
been priced, perhaps some regulators will slack.
In addition, the type of person that chooses to be a bank 
examiner could change. Regulators have employment choices, 
and their choice to be regulators likely derives at least in part from 
their interest in public service. This public spirit is an important 
regulatory asset and should be husbanded. Public service motives 
might be displaced by financial motivations among new hires 
after implementation of an incentive compensation scheme. 
Eventually, the composition of the regulatory agency could 
change for the worse.
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We do not discount these concerns. Social scientists have docu-
mented the crowding-out effect in experimental settings. We do not 
believe, however, the effect is necessarily universal or sufficiently well 
understood that experimentation with incentive compensation 
for regulators should be precluded. Moreover, as described above, 
the federal government has already begun experimenting with 
financial incentives for regulators. Enormous pay raises have been 
implemented at several executive agencies. Bank regulators have 
received bonuses for “good” performance during the crisis, although 
without any transparency or standards of which we are aware. These 
examples suggest that public spiritedness and financial reward are 
not mutually exclusive, at least up to a point. Our innovation is to 
rely on market pricing and specific observable outcomes to set bonus 
pay, instead of relying on fiat. Our approach makes incentive pay 
more transparent, more sensitive to performance, and less subject 
to political, class, gender, racial, or other biases. 
As for selection effects, our incremental approach suggests 
that such effects from variability of pay are likely to be minor, 
at least in the early stages. More generally, the possibility that 
increased pay variability might change the mix of individuals 
opting to serve as examiners could be a good thing. Examiners 
screened by their commitment to the public interest were in 
fact insufficiently attentive to that interest during the recent 
crisis. Accordingly, attracting individuals interested in a variable 
pay-for-social-performance compensation structure may be a 
beneficial change.
 
noisy proxies | A basic objection to our approach is that it 
simply won’t work. Our market-based incentives may be too 
blunt to be effective. Even after adjustments for relative per-
formance, many important influences besides the regulator’s 
input will affect the market pricing of the bank’s debt and 
equity securities. Decisions by the CEO and senior officers, for 
example, will generally dwarf the regulator’s influence over the 
bank’s performance and the market price of its securities. If the 
regulator’s decisions have little impact on the bank or the price 
of its securities, the argument goes, then our scheme will have 
weak if any incentive effects on regulators.
Moreover, though private firms often extend option compen-
sation to rank-and-file employees, and not just executives, there is 
some debate as to whether broad-based option plans create effec-
tive performance incentives. No matter how much harder they 
work, individual employees are not likely to be able to exert much 
influence on firm value. Given their individual small shares in 
their firms, they might rather free ride than increase their effort. 
These potential obstacles to performance pay schemes in 
private firms should not deter us, however. Our situation is differ-
ent. Regulators are not tasked with the general goal of increasing 
banks’ value. Their charge is far more specific and their incentive 
structure is more targeted. Regulators’ charge is to guard against 
excessive bank risk taking, and our debt-heavy portfolio of phan-
tom bank securities focuses regulators on that task. In a well-run 
bank that does not incur excessive risk, it may be true—as with 
rank-and-file employees in private firms—that examiners’ ability 
to affect the value of the bank’s securities and their own debt-
heavy portfolios is weak or non-existent. But that is as it should 
be. The regulator has only a minor role to play at a bank that is 
not pushing the risk envelope. Moreover, in that situation, the 
costs to the government of performance incentives are low since 
the market value of the bank’s debt will probably not move much. 
The bank’s debt will enjoy a consistently low risk premium.
However, in the opposite scenario, when a bank pushes the 
risk envelope and the market value of its debt declines, examin-
ers have personal financial incentives to respond. This is the 
situation where performance incentives cause the regulator’s 
self-interest to correspond with social welfare interests, inducing 
the regulator’s vigilance. If that situation never comes to pass, all 
the better. It may be that, especially during good times, regulatory 
action has little effect on most banks’ value or the value of most 
banks’ securities. However, when a bank strays, prompt and effec-
tive regulatory action may be critical to avoiding large losses. For 
this bank and this regulator, the incentives will matter. 
Conclusion
There is no reason we can think of why bank regulators should 
not be paid for performance. The crucial issues are whether one 
can identify what “good” and “bad” performance are, whether 
contracts can be written ex ante that operationalize these met-
rics, and whether the potential negative effects from introduc-
ing a pay-for-performance culture for regulators outweigh the 
potential social welfare gains. We have argued that bank regula-
tion is an area where there are readily available metrics, where 
plausible contracts or payment schedules could be devised, and 
where the potential for crowd-out or other downsides from 
incentive pay are limited. 
Accordingly, we propose that bank examiners be paid in part 
with a mix of debt-heavy incentives linked to bank equity and 
debt values. This pay should represent a substantial but not dom-
inant part of examiner pay, should be paid out over a number of 
years, and should adjust in order to maintain incentives aligned 
with the regulatory mission of ensuring that bank risk taking is 
aligned with the social welfare. A separate takeover bonus would 
encourage examiners to make bank takeover decisions optimally 
to minimize DIF losses.
Although seemingly radical, our proposal is consistent with 
recent moves by regulators to pay bonuses for good work and to 
generally increase the quality and efficiency of regulation. It is 
also consistent with laws and academic proposals to alter bank 
CEO pay to take greater account of the social component of bank 
losses. Our contribution is to merely point out that regulator 
incentives are an overlooked but crucial factor affecting bank 
risk taking, and that improving the social performance of banks 
and the banking system requires a consideration of the incentives 
not only of bank CEOs but also of bank regulators. Insofar as we 
can improve the efficiency of government regulators, we need to 
worry less about the structure of private incentives, which are 
further from the control of government.  
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